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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
JOYCE K. JACOBSEN (Kalanquin), 
Plaintiff and Appellant 
vs. 
SHIRLEY F. JACOBSEN, 
Defendant and Appellee. 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Appellate Court No. 930496-CA 
A request to the Court of Appeals to review its decision of 
March 28, 1995, which upheld the decision of June 30, 1993 of the 
First District Court, Cache County, State of Utah, Judge Gordon 
J. Low presiding, denying the Plaintiff-Appellant's MOTION TO SET 
ASIDE DIVORCE DECREE AND FOR NEW TRIAL ON ISSUES OF PROPERTY 
SETTLEMENT. 
Argument Priority Classification is 15. 
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P A ! I D T OCT A D D C A I C 
Summary of The Argument 
This Petition For Rehearing is submitted by the Plaintiff-
Appellant (hereinafter Mrs. Kalanquin) pursuant to Rule 35, Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure. Following are points of law or 
fact which the Court of Appeals has overlooked or misapprehended 
and petitioner's arguments thereon. Mrs. Kalanquin's claims are 
fourfold: (1) the Court applied the incorrect standard of review 
of the trial court's interpretation of the term "disclosure"; (2) 
the Court misapprehended the fundamental issue and position which 
Mrs. Kalanquin was arguing; (3) the Court overlooked and failed 
to address pivotal points of argument in Mrs. Kalanquin's brief 
pertaining to interpretation of the term "disclosure"; and (4) 
the Court overlooked and failed to address Mrs. Kalanquin's 
alternative argument that a meeting of the minds had not 
occurred. 
Point 1 
The Court of Appeals appears to have misapprehended the 
standard of review regarding the trial court's interpretation of 
the term "disclosure". 
In the Court's Memorandum Decision (hereinafter decision) of 
April 28, 1995, it discusses the issue of disclosure of property 
at Page 3. The court there states: "We do not find the court's 
interpretation of 'disclosure' unwarranted." The court further 
states that the district court's interpretation of the term 
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"disclosure" is consistent with the definition of that term in 
Black's Law Dictionary. 
The Court, however, seems to have failed to recognize that 
the standard of review is not whether the district court's 
interpretation is warranted or reasonable or consistent; the 
standard of review is whether the district court's interpretation 
is correct. [See Brief of Mrs. Kalanquin at Page 2; Stacey 
Properties v. Wixen, 766 P2d 1080 (Utah App. 1988); Faulkner v. 
Farnsworth, 714 P2d 1149, 1150 (Utah 1986); and In Re; The Estate 
of Leone Southwick v. Leone, 222 Utah Advance Reports 60 (Utah 
App. 1993).] 
Under the cases cited, the appeals court is required to 
review the trial court's interpretation of the term "disclosure" 
for correctness and to render its independent interpretation of 
that term. It does not appear that the court of appeals did 
this. Rather, it appears that the trial court's interpretation 
was simply upheld as "not ... unwarranted" and as "consistent 
with" other accepted definitions. [Memorandum Decision, page 3.] 
Point 2 
The Court of Appeals appears to have misapprehended what 
Mrs. Kalanquin was challenging in the trial court's decision. 
The Court of Appeals appears to have misunderstood what Mrs. 
Kalanquin was arguing. On page 1 of its decision it states that 
Mrs. Kalanquin is "challenging the trial court's finding that she 
had knowledge of all of her [sic] Jacobsen's property". This is 
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incorrect. Mrs. Kalanquin is challenging the trial court's 
finding that there was a "disclosure" of all of the Defendant-
Appellee's (hereinafter Mr. Jacobsen) property. [See Statement 
of the Issues in Mrs. Kalanquin's brief at page 1.] Under the 
correct interpretation of "disclosure", asserted by Mrs. 
Kalanquin, any knowledge she may have had of Mr. Jacobsen's 
property is irrelevant. 
Point 3 
The Court of Appeals overlooked and failed to address the 
points of argument raised by Mrs. Kalanquin as to how the term 
"disclosure" should be interpreted. 
In her brief, under Detail of The Argument, numbers 1 
through 5 (pages 10-15) and number 9 (pages 25-26), Mrs. 
Kalanquin sets forth the requisite rules, supported by legal 
authority, by which interpretation of the term "disclosure" 
should be done. The brief of Mr. Jacobsen completely failed to 
address Mrs. Kalanquin's arguments regarding these. This is 
understandable. There is simply nothing in the trial record 
indicating that the trial court observed these requirements of 
interpretation. However, the Court of Appeals, in its decision, 
is likewise devoid of such observance. Although such rules of 
interpretation are quite elementary it is this very fundamental 
nature that makes them most deserving of a response. 
The trial court's interpretation of the meaning of 
"disclosure" made it nearly a synonym for "discovered". While 
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this may be warranted by and consistent with Mr. Black's 
definition (which shows variant meanings), it still does not 
reveal what the correct definition is, in the context of the 
Stipulation of August 27, 1987, as determined by the rules of 
interpretation by which the courts should be bound. 
The single, overriding issue which Mrs. Kalanquin argued in 
her brief regards the interpretation of the term "disclosure". 
This issue colors all others. The Court appears to have the 
misapprehension that Mrs. Kalanquin is trying to relieve herself 
"from a stipulation negotiated and entered into with the advice 
of counsel." [Memorandum Decision at page 3.] On the contrary, 
Mrs. Kalanquin is seeking to enforce the terms of the 
Stipulation, which Mr. Jacobsen also negotiated and entered into 
with the advice of counsel. What Mrs. Kalanquin is trying to 
relieve herself of is the trial court's incorrect interpretation 
of a term of that Stipulation. If the trial court's 
interpretation of "disclosure" is incorrect then this case must 
be remanded to determine whether disclosure took place and if so, 
whether such disclosure was full and complete, as required under 
the Stipulation. 
Point 4 
The Court of Appeals overlooked and failed to address the 
alternative argument of Mrs. Kalanquin that a meeting of the 
minds had not occurred. 
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In her brief, at page 26, Mrs. Kalanquin argued that if the 
meaning of the term "disclosure" was found to be ambiguous and 
the interpretations by Plaintiff-Appellant and Defendant-Appellee 
are equally reasonable, there was not a meeting of the minds 
sufficient to form a contract. In that event, the Stipulation of 
August 27, 1987, and the Order which derived therefrom would be 
void and the parties must find themselves at the point prior to 
Stipulation. 
It does not appear that the Court of Appeals considered this 
argument. 
Conclusion 
From the Memorandum Decision of the Court of Appeals it 
appears that the Court overlooked or misapprehended several 
facts, arguments, or points of law which would be determinative 
of this appeal. Mrs. Kalanquin humbly petitions the Court to 
consider again the above noted points, review her brief in this 
appeal and grant the relief requested therein. 
We the undersigned, Attorneys for the Petitioner, certify 
that this Petition For Rehearing is presented in good faith and 
not for delay. 
Respectfully submitted this [(/— Day of Aflnt/ , 1995. 
MICHAEL W. ISBELL 
- 6 -
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the J\L~ day of ftfx?^ < 1994, 
two (2) true and correct copies of the foregoing ^ PETITION FOR 
REHEARING, were hand delivered to the following: 
Thomas L. Willmore 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 525 
Logan, Utah 84321 ^ )/?/ / Q /? 
Attorney 
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